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Delegated Monitoring of Fund Managers
Abstract
Because a money manager learns more about her skill from her management experience than
outsiders can learn from her realized returns, she expects ineﬃciency in future contracts that
condition exclusively on realized returns. A fund family that learns what the manager learns can
reduce this ineﬃciency cost if the family is large enough. The family’s incentive is to retain any
given manager regardless of her skill but, when the family has enough managers, it adds value by
boosting the credibility of its retentions through the ﬁring of others. In this way, large fund families
add value through cross-sectional reputation. As the number of managers grows the eﬃciency loss
goes to zero.
1 Introduction
Open-end mutual funds intermediate much of consumers’ investment in ﬁnancial securities. The
consumers’ relationship to their funds’ portfolio managers (just ‘managers,’ from here on) has been
analyzed extensively as that of principals to their agents,1 but as these analyses generally observe,
there is a potentially important layer of agency between consumers and their funds’ managers. A
manager does not work directly for her investors, but rather for a mutual-fund organization such as
Fidelity Management Corporation which contracts with many investors on the one hand and with
several managers on the other. In this paper, we analyze how this contract structure adds value
using a two-period model of the money-management problem.
The questions we address are similar to the ones about banks studied by Diamond (1984),
but the economic considerations are quite diﬀerent. Banks facilitate an entrepreneur’s borrowing
against his future output when the expense of observing his output is too much for individual
investors. These investors must punish when underpaid, but a bank that monitors does not, and is
itself punished less the more (statistically independent) loans it handles simultaneously. A manager
does not need this service, since her output is her return, which is easily observed. Her challenge is
rather to sell her expected output when the expense of observing her expectation is too much. In
this context, she anticipates informational ineﬃciency in her future contracts which, as we show,
can be reduced by a fund family, and more eﬀectively so when the family handles more managers
simultaneously.
Observing a manager’s expectation regarding her own prospects is expensive because of how
this expectation develops. A manager learns about her prospects from her money-management
experience. That is, she begins with some sense of her ability to add value, but has a better sense
after actually trying. So she does not know before a period of management all that she will know
about her skill afterward. Also, she learns more about her ability than her portfolio return conveys,
which is to say her performance to a future date will be an insuﬃcient statistic for what she knows
about her prospects on that date. It is cheap for outsiders to observe her portfolio returns but
presumably expensive to observe what she learns about herself, so the manager expects ineﬃciency
in future contracts if those contracts impute only the cheap information. The empirical evidence
(e.g., Edelen, 1999) indicates that consumers get little or none of the surplus created by mutual-
fund management, so the incidence of ex post ineﬃciency represents an ex ante expected cost to
1Important papers include Bhattacharya and Pﬂeiderer (1985), Starks (1987), Heinkel and Stoughton (1994),
Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1997), Huddart (1999), and Das and Sundaram (2002).
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the manager that she would like to reduce. Delegated monitoring reduces this cost by imputing
the manager’s future learning into future contracts.
A simple model of the contracting problem makes this point in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage we
show the beneﬁt of perfect, costless monitoring: the manager’s expected surplus is seen to improve,
relative to the public-information case, when all her future private information informs her future
contract. So perfect costless monitoring adds value, but this is an incomplete rationale for delegated
monitoring of fund managers because, as Diamond (1984) observes, delegated monitoring brings
agency problems of its own. So the second stage delegates monitoring to a self-interested third
party. The self-interest derives from the cost of replacing a manager, which encourages monitors
to retain even those managers they privately know not to be skilled. What restores the monitor’s
credibility, and therefore recovers the value of monitoring, is simultaneous monitoring of a number
of funds. This result is similar to that for bank monitoring but it applies to money management for a
diﬀerent reason. In the banking context, monitoring works better when loans are numerous because
the incidence of default by the bank is reduced. In the money-management context, monitoring
works better with more than one manager because the ﬁring of some of a fund family’ managers
can boost the expected ability of those remaining.
The empirical mutual-fund literature has explored some actions of managers’ employers. Kho-
rana (1996) documents the relation between return and continued employment, and Chevalier and
Ellison (1999) show demotion and separation following poor return, and promotion following high
return. The related literature on delegated portfolio management is primarily concerned with
screening and portfolio choice. In Huberman and Kandel (1993) and Huddart (1999), risk-averse
managers know their skill ex ante, and choose their portfolios knowing that investors will infer
skill from their portfolios’ returns. Both analyses ﬁnd pooling and separating equilibria, where the
separating equilibria involve skilled managers investing in the one risky asset more aggressively, so
that, win or lose, they are identiﬁable ex post as the skilled ones. Heinkel and Stoughton (1994)
also address the situation where a manager knows her ability and investors try to infer it; they con-
clude that managers must beat a benchmark return to be rehired. We depart from these papers by
focusing on what managers learn from experience about their ability. This focus has an antecedent
in Lynch and Musto (2002), which is not about monitoring but about fund ﬂows. When investors
infer that investment advisors replace underperforming strategies, the resulting theoretical relation
between returns and net investment is seen to take the convex shape documented in the empir-
ical literature (e.g., Ippolito, 1992), and fund ﬂows are seen empirically to respond positively to
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evidence of replacement. Finally, Berk and Green (2002) show that the relationship between fund
ﬂows and past fund returns dissipates performance persistence in competitive rational markets.
The problem of credible delegated monitoring has been explored in contexts other than banking.
For example, Baiman, Evans and Noel (1987) study the problem of credible auditing, in which a
self-interested auditor may choose not to exert an eﬀort while performing his duties. To our
knowledge, delegated monitoring of money managers has not been treated theoretically. However,
many empirical regularities are documented by Tufano and Sevick (1997). One notable ﬁnding is
that the average mutual-fund board member, at one of the 50 largest sponsors, is on the board
of 16 funds. This multiplicity of board seats, they report, is sometimes thought to give the fund
sponsor too much inﬂuence over the directors. One contribution of our analysis is to show how this
arrangement can actually be eﬃcient, and how monitoring only one fund could create no value at
all.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we deﬁne and motivate the two-
period model. In section 3, we show the eﬃciency loss incurred in the absence of monitoring. In
section 4, we allow the manager to work in a fund family and discuss the agency problem that
prevents eﬀective monitoring by a one-fund family. We then show when and how a two-fund family
can recover value, and generalize the result to N funds. Some alternate speciﬁcations and agency
problems are discussed in section 5. Finally, section 6 summarizes and concludes. All proofs are in
Appendix A.
2 The Model
There are two periods (t = 1, 2), in each of which a diﬀerent large group of small risk-neutral
investors shows up: a set of A investors each have a dollar to invest in the ﬁrst period, and a new
set of A investors each have a dollar to invest in the second period. In both periods, uninformed
investments in ﬁnancial markets yield an unconditional return which is either x ∈ (0, 1] or −x with
equal probabilities. So uninformed investments have a zero expected return.2
Each period’s investors can pool their money into a fund and hire a risk-neutral agent to manage
it. The cost of operating the fund is k > 0, which is absorbed equally by each of the investors. This
cost represents expenses incurred by the fund for transacting, hiring personnel, buying computer
equipment, and so on. Once hired, the fund manager generates signals which are potentially
2Equivalently, we can think of these returns as excess returns after properly accounting for risk.
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informative about the returns of traded ﬁnancial assets.3 Skilled managers generate excess expected
returns. More precisely, a manager with skill α ∈ (0, 1) improves the probability that returns are
positive to 1+α2 >
1
2 , whereas unskilled managers cannot improve on the unconditional return
distribution. Managers are skilled with probability φ, and the random variable
a˜ =
{
α, prob. φ
0, prob. 1 − φ (1)
denotes a manager’s skill, which is initially unknown. In each period t, we denote the event that
the manager is hired by an indicator function h˜t. The investors’ return in period t is therefore4
r˜t =

 +x, prob.
1+h˜ta˜
2
−x, prob. 1−h˜ta˜2 .
(2)
Skill does not translate to better returns without spending k, which is assumed large relative
to individuals’ investible funds, so individuals are interested in investing their money with the
manager. If the manager is skilled then their expected return, gross of fees, rises from zero to
E
[
r˜t | h˜t = 1, a˜ = α
]
= xα > 0. Hiring an unskilled manager (a˜ = 0), on the other hand, yields no
excess return, as E
[
r˜t |h˜t = 1, a˜ = 0
]
= 0. Therefore, the expected surplus, net of the administrative
cost k, created by a skilled manager with A under management is Axα − k and the expected net
surplus from a manager with probability p of being skilled is Axαp − k.
At the beginning of the ﬁrst period neither the manager nor the investors knows whether the
manager is skilled, so they all calculate the probability she is skilled to be φ, and therefore all
calculate the expected net value the manager creates to be Axαφ − k. At the beginning of the
second period, investors update φ with public information, and the manager updates φ with what
she has privately learned. The public information used by investors is the manager’s ﬁrst-period
return. The manager’s private information tells her exactly whether or not she is skilled, meaning
that for her, φ goes to either 0 or 1. So the public learns something about whether or not the
manager is skilled, but the manager learns everything. The assumption that managers learn their
skill perfectly is for computational simplicity; it is not crucial to the analysis that the manager
learn perfectly, only that she learns strictly more than the public. This captures the fact that she
3We assume the signals are free, i.e., there is no private eﬀort cost, so as to avoid conﬂating the dynamics of
interest here with moral hazards. A previous version of this paper (available upon request) had a private eﬀort cost
and results were similar.
4We could have incorporated the operating cost of the fund into the returns by subtracting k from both +x and
−x. This would not aﬀect any of our results. In fact, this would be equivalent to assuming that k is proportional
to A.
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knows not only her return but also the portfolio that generated it, why she bought that portfolio,
how the realized returns of diﬀerent assets compare to her ex ante expectations, and so on.
At the beginning of each period the manager announces a compensation contract that she is
willing to work for, and the period’s investors accept or reject the oﬀer. This setup mirrors the
mutual fund industry in that funds publicly announce their fees and investors are free to choose
whether they want to invest. Given that returns can take only two possible values in each period,
this contract is fully characterized by the wage that will be paid by the investors to the manager
in each of the two states. We make two assumptions about contracting. First, there is no negative
compensation: instead of paying, the manager would just ﬁle bankruptcy. Second, we represent
the empirical ﬁndings on mutual-fund performance by assuming that the contract leaves investors
zero expected surplus.
Because investors and the manager agree at the time of ﬁrst-period contracting that the prob-
ability of a high ﬁrst-period return is 1+αφ2 , they all calculate the same expected wage for a given
contract, and therefore any contract with expectation Axαφ − k under these probabilities serves
equally well. The manager cannot be hired in the ﬁrst place if this quantity is negative so we
assume that the parameters satisfy the restriction
φ ≥ k
Axα
. (3)
Because the manager has private information after the ﬁrst period about the probability of a high
second-period return (it is 1+α2 if the manager learned she is skilled and
1
2 otherwise), there is a
signaling problem with second-period contracts. Among the contracts under which investors expect
zero surplus, skilled managers prefer the contract with the lowest payment for low returns. The
equilibrium contract pays the minimum for low returns, which under our assumptions is zero.5
Thus, the second-period contract the manager oﬀers takes the form
w˜2 =
{
ω, if r˜2 = +x
0, if r˜2 = −x,
(4)
Since ω is the contract’s only moving part, we sometimes refer to the second-period contract simply
as ω. Under the assumption that investors get zero expected surplus, the ω oﬀered by the manager
is the one at which investors calculate an expected net return of zero.
5A formal proof that this contract is signaling-proof is provided in Appendix B. It is also worth mentioning
that, in a model where skill gets impounded into performance only through costly eﬀort, the contract that pays the
manager only after positive returns would also provide the strongest incentives.
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First-period investors accept or reject w˜1
Manager collects information and invests the investors’ money
First-period fund return and payoﬀs realized
If hired in the ﬁrst period, the manager privately observes her own skill
Manager oﬀers a compensation contract w˜2 for the second period
Second-period investors accept or reject w˜2
Manager collects information and invests the investors’ money
Second-period fund return and payoﬀs realized
reject
reject accept
accept
Nature draws unobservable manager’s skill
game ends
Manager oﬀers a compensation contract w˜1 for the ﬁrst period
F
ir
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ri
od
Se
co
nd
pe
ri
od
Figure 1: Sequence of events.
3 Equilibrium in the Absence of Monitoring
3.1 Strategies and Equilibrium
The chronology of this economy is in Figure 1. It begins with the manager oﬀering investors to
manage their money for one period in return for a compensation contract w˜1. The investors are
free to decide whether or not to hire the money manager. If hired, the manager collects information
and invests the investors’ money. The ﬁrst period ends with the manager observing her ability and
investors receiving their ﬁrst-period payoﬀs. The second period repeats the process, except that
second-period investors can use the ﬁrst-period returns to update their beliefs about the manager’s
ability. The economy ends after the second-period payoﬀs.
The manager makes one decision per period, which is the compensation contract she oﬀers, and
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the period’s investors’ one decision in each period is to accept or reject. Since the manager and
investors are symmetrically informed at the outset, ﬁrst-period contracting is straightforward: as
mentioned above, the equilibrium contract has an expected value of Axαφ − k, regardless of its
form, and the investors accept it. From here on we focus exclusively on the second period, and
accordingly drop the time subscript so as to minimize notation. The second-period contract has
an important dependence on investors’ beliefs about the manager.
Lemma 3.1 Suppose that, at the beginning of the second period, investors assign a probability p
that the manager is skilled. The manager is then hired by the investors if and only if
p ≥ k
Axα
. (5)
The manager’s compensation in that period is then
ω = ω(p) ≡ 2(Axαp − k)
1 + αp
. (6)
The manager’s expected net surplus, as calculated by investors, is Axαp − k, so condition (5)
simply states that the manager will be hired when this expectation is non-negative. In that case,
the manager extracts all surplus by charging ω(p) for a positive return. Note that ω(p) is increasing
in p, so that both the probability of, and compensation for, a high return increase as the manager’s
apparent skill grows.
What is the manager’s apparent skill? Investors start with prior belief φ and then update with
the manager’s realized return via Bayes’ Rule.
Lemma 3.2 After ﬁrst-period fund returns of +x, investors assign a probability of
φ+x ≡ (1 + α)φ1 + αφ (7)
to the manager being skilled. After ﬁrst-period fund returns of −x, investors assign a probability of
φ−x ≡ (1 − α)φ1 − αφ (8)
to the manager being skilled.
The connection between skill and returns delivers φ+x > φ > φ−x. Since φ was already high
enough for the manager to be hired, this implies immediately that the manager is retained after
good performance, and that her expected compensation conditional on good performance (but not
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on whether she is skilled) is her expected net surplus Axαφ+x − k. On the other hand, φ−x could
be either less or greater than kAxα . The manager is ﬁred if it is less, and retained if it is greater,
with an expected compensation conditional on poor performance of Axαφ−x − k. The next section
calculates the second-period compensation the manager expects at the outset, before anyone learns
her ability, by combining these quantities.
3.2 Manager Proﬁts
The manager’s expected second-period compensation at the outset, which we denote π0, is the
probability of good performance times the expected compensation conditional on good performance,
plus the probability of bad performance times the expected compensation, if any, conditional on
bad performance. This is a simple calculation, but it is useful to arrange the result in a functional
form that isolates the potential beneﬁt of monitoring.
Proposition 3.1 If φ−x < kAxα , then
π0 = φ(Axα − k) − (1 − α)φ2 (Axα − k) −
1 − φ
2
k, (9)
and if φ−x ≥ kAxα , then
π0 = φ(Axα − k) − (1 − φ)k. (10)
There is one source of expected value creation and two potential sources of expected value
destruction in second-period contracts. All value creation comes from the value Axα − k created
by skilled managers. The manager’s initial probability of being skilled is φ, so the expected value
creation from always hiring exactly the skilled managers is φ(Axα − k). The sources of expected
value destruction are the ﬁring of skilled managers and the retention of unskilled managers. Firing
a skilled manager destroys Axα−k, i.e., the value the skilled manager would have created; retaining
an unskilled manager destroys k, i.e., the administrative cost k paid for a manager who creates
no value. If only good performers are retained (i.e., if φ−x < kAxα), then the manager loses in
expectation from being ﬁred while skilled in the outcome where she does poorly but learns she is
skilled, which has probability (1−α)φ2 ; similarly, she loses in expectation from being retained while
unskilled in the outcome where she does well but learns she is unskilled, which has probability 1−φ2 .
If good and bad performers are all retained (i.e., if φ−x ≥ kAxα), then all loss comes from being
retained while unskilled, which has probability 1 − φ.
This formulation shows how the manager loses from ineﬃcient contracting, and what the man-
ager would pay for a service that improves eﬃciency. For example, if φ−x ≥ kAxα then the manager
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would pay up to (1−φ)k for a service that would, in a way that is credible to investors, simply ﬁre
her if she is unskilled. And in general she would pay for a service that decreases the incidence of
being retained while unskilled by more than Axα−kk times the amount it increases the incidence of
being ﬁred while skilled. In the remainder of this paper we show how this service can be provided
by delegated monitoring.
4 Delegated Monitoring
How can the manager incorporate her private learning into future contracts? The method we
propose is to submit to delegated monitoring by working as one manager in a fund family. There
are other forms delegated monitoring might take; we focus on fund families to show how this popular
organizational form can deliver this important beneﬁt. To the manager of the previous section we
oﬀer the opportunity to join a simpliﬁed fund family: for a cut of her wage, the fund family
intermediates her initial contract with the public, learns her skill along with her, and then either
retains or ﬁres her. It is immediate that this arrangement recovers all value (gross of the family’s
cut) if the family retains exactly the skilled managers; what is more interesting and meaningful
is whether it adds value in the context of realistic incentives for the family to retain or ﬁre. We
present the benchmark case of perfect monitoring, discuss the incentive problem, and then resolve
the problem. The key to the resolution is seen to be the proliferation of funds within the family.
4.1 Fund Family Deﬁned
The manager can join a fund family at the outset. To join, the manager negotiates a fraction µ
of her second-period wages, if any, that will go to the family. The family oﬀers contracts to the
public. As before we assume that investors pay all expected surplus, so the ﬁrst-period expected
wage is again Axαφ − k. The family has access to the same information as the manager and so
learns her skill over the ﬁrst period, and then retains or ﬁres her. Second-period investors also pay
all expected surplus so, if investors calculate a probability p that the manager is skilled, then her
second period wage is ω(p).
The role of µ in the model is to represent the sensitivity of the family’s wealth to the public’s
belief about the manager’s skill, and to the manager’s actual skill. Since ω(p) increases with p, the
family’s wealth increases with the public’s belief, and since ω(p) is paid only for good returns, the
family’s wealth increases with the manager’s skill, controlling for the public’s belief. We do not
model the negotiation over µ; we assume only that if monitoring creates expected value, then the
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negotiated µ splits this expected value between the family and the manager.
The level of µ does not represent the cost to the family of monitoring the manager. If monitoring
is costly to the family then µ must recoup this cost in expectation to be economical (see section 5
for more discussion of this point). The cost of monitoring could in any case be conﬁdentiality, not
resources. In particular, it might be expensive for investors, but not the family, to learn what the
manager learns because the manager must hide her beliefs and trading from the public to defend
against front-running. It is intuitively safer to disclose this sensitive information to a short list of
closely-watched board members, and the cost of disclosing to people with easy access to trading
records and other operational data is presumably small.
The assumption that the family’s income is exclusively from retained managers represents a
replacement cost. Since the family would presumably recruit and earn revenue from a replacement
for a ﬁred manager, the implicit assumption is that this would be a wash, i.e., the replacement cost
equals the subsequent revenue. This equality is for convenience and not important to the analysis;
it is suﬃcient that the replacement cost be a signiﬁcant deterrent to ﬁring the initial manager. This
same cost explains the zero net revenue from all managers in the ﬁrst period. Income from the ﬁrst
period is unimportant to incentives in any case since ﬁrst-period wages are the same regardless of
the family’s actions. Section 5 describes an alternate source of the agency problem, one fashioned
after Ross (1977).
4.2 First-Best and the Agency Problem
The best monitoring can do is eliminate all contracting ineﬃciency by retaining a manager if and
only if she is skilled. This gives the manager an expected second-period wage of φ(Axα−k), which
can be compared to her expected wage in the absence of monitoring as derived in Proposition 3.1. If
φ−x <
k
Axα , then the expected wage improves on the unmonitored case by the amount
(1−α)φ
2 (Axα−
k) + 1−φ2 k; if φ−x ≥ kAxα , then it improves by the amount (1 − φ)k. So ﬁrst-best monitoring adds
a positive amount of expected value which the family and manager can share through the µ they
negotiate.
If a family’s incentives were to retain only skilled managers then the analysis of delegated
monitoring would end here. However, the incentives to ﬁre are too weak because replacing the
manager brings zero net revenue. So a manager gets no eﬃciency gains from being a family’s only
manager as the family would never ﬁre its only source of net revenue.
One path to an incentive to ﬁre unskilled managers is reputation. Reputation is typically
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viewed as a time series dynamic, and that dynamic could be important here. Firing is costly in
the short run, but it may build reputation that pays oﬀ later through the credibility of future
retentions. However, if the family can monitor more than one fund, it is not necessary to wait
for reputation to pay oﬀ. Rather than time-series reputation, the important dynamic may be
cross-sectional reputation where the ﬁring of some managers pays oﬀ through the credibility of
simultaneous retentions. The rest of this section shows how this can work, ﬁrst in the simplest
two-manager case, and then in the general N -manager case.
4.3 The Two-Fund Family
Instead of one manager in the family, now there are two managers, each with A dollars. The two
managers have independently distributed skill and returns, and we allow them and the family to
contract at the outset on a ﬁring policy. The ﬁring policies we allow are commitments by the
family to ﬁre a stated number of good performers, and a stated number of bad performers (both
numbers could be zero), conditional on the performance realization. That is, with two managers
there are three possible performance realizations — both good, both bad and one good and one bad
— and the ﬁring policy decides whether 0, 1 or 2 managers are ﬁred if both have good ﬁrst-period
performance, how many are ﬁred if both have bad performance, and whether the good performer,
the bad performer or both are ﬁred if one is good and the other bad. Commitment is assumed
to be costless: it is costless for the family to contract on the ﬁring policy, and the family honors
the contract at no additional cost. If instead this is costly then the expected value created by
monitoring must be at least this cost.
We do not allow all possible ﬁring policies. In particular we do not allow policies where the family
decides after the ﬁrst period how many good performers or bad performers to ﬁre. Such policies
push the model into a complex signaling environment where the public must calculate what each
possible combination of publicly-observable performance outcome and publicly-observable ﬁring
outcome implies about the privately-observable skill outcome. The number of calculations grows
exponentially with the number of managers, quickly becoming unmanageable. With our restriction
on ﬁring policies the public sees exactly the ﬁring outcome it expects, given the performance
outcome, so the signaling complication is removed. Since complex signaling strategies could be
useful to fund families, our results with this constrained set of policies can be viewed as lower
bounds on the value families create as delegated monitors.
Firing policies add value to the extent they impute the family’s private observation of skill.
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Conditional on the performance realization the public knows how many good and how many bad
performers will be ﬁred but they don’t know which good and bad performers will be ﬁred. They
also know that the family decides, the family knows who is skilled and, everything else equal, the
family is better oﬀ retaining a skilled manager than an unskilled manager. So the ﬁring policy
adds value to the extent that the family has a choice whom to ﬁre because the public learns about
a manager from the fact that she was not chosen. We solve this problem by ﬁrst narrowing in on
the scenarios where the family has an informative choice to make, and then calculating the value
added in the resulting equilibrium.
Several observations on the two-manager problem simplify the solution considerably. First, the
family cannot add value by committing to ﬁring both managers in a given outcome because the
reputation created by ﬁring both would not pay oﬀ for anybody. Second, the family does not
commit to ﬁring the poor performer (or to ﬁring the good performer) when one performance is
good and the other bad, because doing so does not tell the public anything more than it already
knows from ﬁrst-period returns. So the ﬁring policy pays oﬀ only if both performances are good or
both are bad, and the decisions to make at the outset are whether to ﬁre 0 or 1 if both returns are
good, and whether to ﬁre 0 or 1 if both are bad.
If two managers make the same return r ∈ {−x,+x} in the ﬁrst period, then for each manager
the public calculates the same probability φr that she is skilled. If the family must ﬁre one, where
it is common knowledge that the family retains a skilled manager if possible, then the probability
that the retained manager is skilled is 1 − (1 − φr)2 = φr(2 − φr). Naturally, φr(2 − φr) > φr so
this is a boost to the public’s belief about the retained manager. Whether this boost is a good idea
depends on the relative values of φr and kAxα , as the next proposition summarizes.
Proposition 4.1 If both managers have the same ﬁrst-period return r ∈ {−x,+x}, then the
second-period outcomes with and without delegated monitoring depend on φr and kAxα as follows.
• φr(2 − φr) < kAxα : Neither manager works the second period, with or without delegated mon-
itoring. Value created is zero.
• φr < kAxα ≤ φr(2−φr): Neither works the second period without delegated monitoring, but in
a fund family one is ﬁred and the other works. Value created per manager is 12
[
Axαφr(2 −
φr) − k
]
.
• φ2r < kAxα ≤ φr: Both work without delegated monitoring, but with a delegated monitor one is
ﬁred and the other works. Value created per manager is 12
(
k − Axαφ2r
)
.
12
• kAxα ≤ φ2r: Both work with or without a delegated monitor. Value created is zero.
If the managers are not monitored and therefore retained or ﬁred simply on the strength of their
returns, there are just two regions in which φr can fall. Either φr < kAxα so they are both dismissed
by investors, or φr ≥ kAxα so they are both retained. The proposition shows that monitoring
subdivides these regions. If φr < kAxα but φr(2− φr) ≥ kAxα , then one is ﬁred and the other works.
The boost is enough to allow some employment where none had been possible. If φr ≥ kAxα but
φ2r <
k
Axα then again one is ﬁred and the other works, but the reason is diﬀerent. Monitoring
creates value in this region because it reduces the expected loss from hiring unskilled managers
more than it increases the expected loss from ﬁring skilled managers.
All four scenarios are possible for bad performers, depending on the relation of φ−x to kAxα .
After good performance, the only relevant question is whether φ2+x <
k
Axα , in which case one
manager goes. A useful perspective on the result is that monitoring adds value if kAxα is in the
range
[
φ2r , φr(2−φr)
]
. The width of this range is 2φr(1−φr), which is proportional to the variance
of the manager’s skill conditional on her return. So the measure of the space where monitoring adds
expected value is linear in the uncertainty about managerial skill that is not resolved for investors
by performance.
4.4 The N -Fund Family
We now generalize the fund family to N managers. In this general case, there are N + 1 possible
ﬁrst-period outcomes, one for each possible number M+x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N} of good performers (the
number of bad performers is then M−x = N − M+x). The ﬁring policy dictates, for each of these
outcomes, how many good performers to ﬁre and how many poor performers to ﬁre. As before, it
is common knowledge that the family’s incentive is to retain as many skilled managers as possible.
We characterize the optimal ﬁring policy for a given Mr, r ∈ {−x,+x}, and show that the eﬃciency
outcome approaches ﬁrst-best as N grows.
When choosing its ﬁring policy, the fund family seeks to recover as much of the contracting
ineﬃciency of section 3 as possible. The following proposition characterizes the optimal number
Fr(Mr) of Mr managers with the same ﬁrst-period return r who will be ﬁred. The proposition uses
B(I, J, p) to denote the binomial cumulative distribution function (cdf) for J draws, I successes
and probability p of success.6
6That is, B(I, J, p) =
∑I
i=0
(
J
i
)
pi(1− p)J−i.
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Proposition 4.2 If there is an integer F , 0 < F < Mr, that satisﬁes
B(F − 1,Mr, 1 − φr) < k
Axα
< B(F,Mr, 1 − φr), (11)
then it is optimal for the family to commit to ﬁre Fr(Mr) = F of the Mr managers who make
return r ∈ {−x,+x} in the ﬁrst period. If B(0,Mr, 1− φr) > kAxα , then the optimal number to ﬁre
is zero; if B(Mr − 1,Mr, 1 − φr) < kAxα , then no managers work the second period regardless of
monitoring.
The tradeoﬀ used to derive this result is intuitive: as the family commits to ﬁre a larger number
of managers, the publicly perceived skilled of the remaining managers is higher (implying a larger
per-manager surplus), but there are fewer managers working. The last part of Proposition 4.2
simply points out that, just as in the two-manager case, there are parameters for which ﬁring no
one is optimal, and parameters for which monitoring cannot create any value. As the following
result demonstrates, these parameter ranges shrink as Mr increases.
Lemma 4.1 For any φr > 0 the optimal number F of managers to ﬁre satisﬁes (11) for Mr large
enough.
A large enough fund family adds value because with positive probability it improves on the
zero-ﬁrings case after any performance that might come from an unskilled manager, and it delivers
the possibility of working again after any performance that might come from a skilled manager.
In the previous section, we showed that monitoring by two-fund families adds value if kAxα lands
in a range 2φr(1 − φr) wide. Lemma 4.1 shows that M -fund families add value if kAxα is between
B(0,Mr, 1−φr) and B(Mr −1,Mr, 1−φr), i.e., it is between φMrr and 1−(1−φr)Mr , which expands
to the entire unit interval as Mr grows.
The important quantity in all the results is the ratio kAxα which, if we rewrite it as
k/A
xα , is
seen to be the ratio of the per-dollar administrative expense to the per-dollar value added by skill.
So as the cost of running a fund increases relative to the value added by skill, whether from k
increasing or A or x decreasing, managers prefer policies with more ex-post ﬁring. The eﬀect of
α by itself depends on whether performance is good or bad. If α is higher then there is less ﬁring
after good performance, for two reasons: the loss from ﬁring a skilled manager is higher, and the
likelihood that the performance came from a skilled manager is higher. The eﬀect on ﬁring after
bad performance is ambiguous, because while the loss from ﬁring a skilled manager is higher, the
likelihood that the performance came from a skilled manager is now lower.
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The ﬁring policy described in Proposition 4.2 minimizes contracting ineﬃciencies for every
possible ﬁrst-period outcome. We now show that the remaining ineﬃciency goes to zero as the
number of managers in the fund family grows. So, in the limit, the ﬁrst-best outcome is achieved
through monitoring. We start with the following observation.
Lemma 4.2 As Mr grows,
Fr(Mr)
Mr
converges to 1 − φr.
As the number of managers with a given return increases, the fraction of managers ﬁred con-
verges to the fraction of these managers expected ex ante to be unskilled. This observation leads
to our ﬁnal result.
Proposition 4.3 As the number of funds in the family grows, contracting eﬃciency converges to
ﬁrst-best.
In the limit, the entire eﬃciency loss is recaptured and shared by the family. We reach this
conclusion even though we consider only those ﬁring policies that commit to the relation between
two future observable and veriﬁable events: the number of managers with a given performance,
and the number of those ﬁred. If the contracting parties can do better by giving the family more
ex post ﬂexibility, then the convergence to ﬁrst-best is faster but the limit is the same. Finally,
it is interesting to note that the proofs to all the results in this section do not rely on the return
distribution having two points; the same results would apply in any ﬁnite outcome space.
5 Additional Considerations
In this section we outline a few alternatives to the basic model: a per-manager monitoring cost the
family must recover, the possibility of merging rather than replacing, and an alternate source of
the agency problem that discourages ﬁring.
5.1 Costly Monitoring
Suppose that monitoring a manager costs c. In this case the family loses money unless its expected
per-manager income is at least c, so the negotiated µ must deliver at least this expectation to the
family. This rules out families where the per-manager surplus from the ﬁring policy is below c. If
c exceeds all the eﬃciency losses in Proposition 3.1, i.e., 1−αφ2 (Axα − k) + 1−φ2 k if φ−x < kAxα and
(1−φ)k otherwise, then the managers are better oﬀ managing alone and unmonitored than joining
families, as even perfect eﬃciency does not recover c. If instead c is smaller than the relevant
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quantity, then there is a number N such that the per-manager surplus in families with at least
N managers is above c. In this case, the operative question that a monitoring cost raises is whether
managers can organize into large enough families to make delegated monitoring pay.
5.2 Merging Funds
In the analysis, the cost of recruiting a replacement manager discourages ﬁring. In practice how-
ever, replacement is not strictly necessary because merging is an option. Fund families can, with
the appropriate shareholder and regulatory approvals, merge ﬁred managers’ funds into retained
managers’ funds. If we add to our modelling assumptions that merging is costless then, as long as
at least one manager is skilled, it is straightforward that the family ﬁres all unskilled managers,
retains all skilled managers and merges accordingly. This breaks down only when no manager is
skilled, a contingency whose probability goes to zero as the number N of managers goes to inﬁnity.
Merging is, however, not costless and could easily cost much more than replacement. In ad-
dition to the direct restructuring costs, there are costs from mismatching investors and diluting
the value added by skill. Investors would resist mergers across investment objectives, and even
within investment objectives, fund families lose price-discrimination power when they merge funds
with diﬀerent operating histories (Christoﬀersen and Musto, 2002). Also, the expected return xα
from skill could shrink as assets grow, as in Berk and Green (2002), and if it falls below k/A then
active management costs more than it produces. In short, this mechanism may restore some of the
incentive to ﬁre the unskilled but it replaces one set of costs with another.
5.3 Alternate Agency Problem
The agency problem associated with the ﬁring of unskilled managers is more general than just
replacement costs. Suppose there is no replacement cost and suppose instead that, in the style of
Ross (1977), the family’s expected income I depends on the manager’s true and publicly-perceived
probabilities of being skilled through the relation
I = γ0(perceived probability) + γ1(true probability).
As in Ross (1977), γ0 captures short-term eﬀects of the public’s perception, which in the money-
management business would include the reputation as well as new investment attracted to the fund
and other funds in the complex, whereas γ1 captures longer-term eﬀects such as the eﬀect of the
manager’s true skill on expected future fees and reputation. The pure-strategy equilibrium of a
one-fund family depends on the relative size of γ0 and γ1. If γ0 < γ1 φ1−φ then, in equilibrium, the
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family replaces the manager if and only if she is unskilled, so eﬃciency obtains.7 This equilibrium
does not exist if γ0 > γ1 φ1−φ , so the resulting outcome is ineﬃcient.
In this context, committing the family ex ante to replace F of M managers who look the same to
the public can be viewed as holding constant the number that γ0 multiplies, and using the sensitivity
γ1 to incorporate the family’s learning into second-period contracts. Thus, delegated monitoring
recovers contracting eﬃciency even when the monitor’s exposure to true skill is relatively small.
6 Conclusion
Decades of empirical studies have established that it is very hard to estimate portfolio-manager
skill from realized portfolio returns. The portfolio manager herself has more than her portfolio’s
returns to learn from: she knows why she chose the initial portfolio, how and why she traded it, how
the realizations of individual securities’ returns compare with what she expected, and so on. She
learns more from a period of experience than outsiders learn from a period of portfolio returns, so it
stands to reason that she enters the next period knowing more about her skill than outsiders know.
A manager with a good return could privately know she is not worth hiring, and a manager with
a poor return could privately know she is worth hiring. We consider whether the manager would
prefer to avoid getting into this situation in the ﬁrst place, and whether a monitoring mechanism
could serve this purpose. Our principal ﬁnding is that a monitoring mechanism like that of open-
end mutual funds can improve the utility of managers, and that the multiple-fund monitoring noted
by Tufano and Sevick (1997) is crucial to the eﬀectiveness of monitoring.
The literature has analyzed the situation where managers know more about their skill than
do outsiders. We step back from this situation to the beginning of a manager’s career, when she
intuitively knows little more than outsiders know about whether she adds value. If she expects the
surplus in future contracts, then she expects a beneﬁt from credible monitoring, but credibility is
not automatic. In particular, a one-manager fund family has little credibility if it has discretion
whether to ﬁre its one manager and chooses not to, and it serves no purpose without discretion. We
show how increasing the number of funds monitored by the monitor can work around this incentive
problem. We make this point in the context of money management but the principle applies more
generally. The key elements of the economic situation are that the agent learns about skill over
time, that someone else could also learn at suﬃciently low cost, and that a number of other agents
7If the public expects the family to retain only skilled managers, then the family gets γ0 from retaining an unskilled
manager and (γ1 + γ0)φ from replacing the manager with a rookie (with a rookie’s probability φ of being skilled), so
the belief is rational only for γ0 < γ1 φ1−φ .
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are in a similar situation. This could describe the situation of, for example, assistant professors.
We do not claim to have identiﬁed the only reason why fund managers may want to gather
under the umbrella of a fund family. There are undoubtedly reasons other than the value that
more credible monitoring creates (e.g., marketing reasons). However, our framework could also
be useful to study other aspects of the money-management industry. For instance, it may be
interesting to consider when a fund manager would be better oﬀ leaving a fund family to manage
independently (e.g., start a hedge fund). Our analysis suggests that managers who believe their skill
has been established beyond a doubt would see little beneﬁt from monitoring, as would managers
who perceive little diﬀerence between what they will privately learn about their skill and what their
returns will convey.
The result that monitoring captures more value as the number of funds grows may relate
to the recent development of “funds of funds.”8 Many funds have recently launched with the sole
intention of investing in existing hedge funds. Given the close relation that investors can enjoy with
the hedge funds they patronize, this trend may reﬂect a demand from hedge-fund managers for
credible monitoring. How managers sort into those who manage independently, those who manage
partly for funds-of-funds and those who manage within mutual-fund families is a promising area
for future research.
We analyze the situation where a manager’s performance is publicly observable from the moment
she starts managing. In practice there is some discretion because the family could have the manager
handle house money, or pretend money, for a while. The manager would intuitively have to cross a
threshold of promise, as calculated from this practice experience, to start handling public money.
Outsiders could infer this threshold and therefore know, as the model assumes, the manager’s
promise at that point. So the model still applies in the bigger picture where managers practice
ﬁrst, but it would be interesting to see what the optimal threshold is in this framework.
8We are grateful to Zhiwu Chen for pointing out this possibility to us.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 3.1
Let us denote the investors’ information set at the beginning of period t by It. Since investors
assign a probability p that the manager is skilled, they expect her to generate an average net surplus
of
A
(
E
[
r˜t | It, h˜t = 1, a˜ = α
]
Pr
{
a˜ = α | It
}
+ E
[
r˜t | It, h˜t = 1, a˜ = α
]
Pr
{
a˜ = 0 | It
})− k
= A
[
xαp + 0(1 − p)]− k = Axαp − k
with their money if they hire her. The manager will be hired by the investors if and only if this last
quantity is positive; this is equivalent to (5). In that case, since the investors assign a probability
of
Pr
{
r˜t = +x | It, h˜t = 1, a˜ = α
}
Pr
{
a˜ = α | It
}
+ Pr
{
r˜t = +x | It, h˜t = 1, a˜ = 0
}
Pr
{
a˜ = 0 | It
}
=
1 + α
2
φ +
1
2
(1 − φ) = 1 + αp
2
to the manager generating positive returns in the period, the manager extracts all of the surplus
by announcing a compensation contract of
ωt = ω(p) ≡ 2(Axαp − k)1 + αp .
This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 3.2
This result follows from a simple application of Bayes’ rule:
φ+x ≡ Pr
{
a˜ = α
∣∣ r˜1 = +x, h˜1 = 1}
=
Pr
{
r˜1 = +x
∣∣ a˜ = α, h˜1 = 1}Pr{a˜ = α ∣∣ h˜1 = 1}∑
a=0,α
Pr
{
r˜1 = +x
∣∣ a˜ = a, h˜1 = 1}Pr{a˜ = a ∣∣ h˜1 = 1}
=
1+α
2 φ
1+α
2 φ +
1
2(1 − φ)
=
(1 + α)φ
1 + αφ
.
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Similarly,
φ−x ≡ Pr
{
a˜ = α
∣∣ r˜1 = −x, h˜1 = 1}
=
Pr
{
r˜1 = −x
∣∣ a˜ = α, h˜1 = 1}Pr{a˜ = α ∣∣ h˜1 = 1}∑
a=0,α
Pr
{
r˜1 = −x
∣∣ a˜ = a, h˜1 = 1}Pr{a˜ = a ∣∣ h˜1 = 1}
=
1−α
2 φ
1−α
2 φ +
1
2(1 − φ)
=
(1 − α)φ
1 − αφ .
Proof of Proposition 3.1
If φ−x < kAxα , then the manager works only after a good ﬁrst-period return so π0 is the prob-
ability of a good ﬁrst-period return times the expected surplus conditional on a good ﬁrst-period
return, i.e., 1+αφ2
[
Axα
(
(1+α)φ
1+αφ
)
− k
]
, which rearranges to (9).
If φ−x ≥ kAxα , then the manager works the second period no matter what, so π0 is the same as
the ﬁrst-period expected surplus Axαφ − k, which rearranges to (10).
Proof of Proposition 4.1
If φr(2− φr) < kAxα , then Lemma 3.1 tells us that the probability that the retained manager is
skilled, conditional on her return and the fact that she was retained, is too low for her to work the
second period, so neither manager works the second period.
If φr < kAxα , we know from Lemma 3.1 that the managers cannot work the second period
without monitoring, but if φr(2 − φr) ≥ kAxα , then the retained manager’s probability of being
skilled is high enough to work. The total surplus for the retained manager is Axαφr(2 − φr) − k,
which is shared equally by the two managers at the outset.
If φr ≥ kAxα then, from Lemma 3.1 once again, both managers would work the second period
after making r in the ﬁrst if there were no ﬁring policy, and would get the expected surplus
Axαφr−k. If the fund family commits to ﬁring one of them then the expected surplus of the retained
manager is Axαφr(2 − φr) − k, and each manager’s expected surplus at the outset, conditional on
both managers making r in the ﬁrst period, is 12
[
Axαφr(2−φr)− k
]
. So the expected value added
per manager by the ﬁring policy is 12
[
Axαφr(2 − φr) − k
]− (Axαφr − k) = 12(k − Axαφ2r). So this
is the value added by the ﬁring policy, and it is positive if and only if φ2r <
k
Axα .
Finally, if φ2r ≥ kAxα , then the expected value created by ﬁring one of the two managers,
calculated in the previous paragraph, is negative. So neither is ﬁred and both work (since φr is
then greater than kAxα).
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Proof of Proposition 4.2
We prove the result for a given ﬁrst-period return r ∈ {−x,+x}, and a given number M of
managers who generate that return. Let U represent the number of the M managers who are
unskilled. Suppose that the family commits to ﬁring F of M managers who make return r, and
let T1(F ) and T2(F ) be the probabilities that a manager calculates at the outset that she will be
ﬁred when skilled and retained when unskilled, respectively. The family maximizes expected value
by minimizing total contracting ineﬃciency, i.e., by choosing F to minimize
T1(F )(Axα − k) + T2(F )k.
When the family’s policy is to ﬁre F managers, some skilled managers end up getting ﬁred
when fewer than F of the M managers are unskilled; that is, F −U skilled managers get ﬁred when
U < F . Thus the expected number of skilled managers who get ﬁred is
F−1∑
U=0
(
M
U
)
(1 − φr)UφM−Ur (F − U),
and so a manager’s ex ante probability of being ﬁred while skilled is
T1(F ) =
1
M
F−1∑
U=0
(
M
U
)
(1 − φr)UφM−Ur (F − U).
This means that the commitment to ﬁre an additional manager increases the ex ante probability
of being ﬁred while skilled by
T1(F + 1) − T1(F ) = 1
M
F∑
U=0
(
M
U
)
(1 − φr)UφM−Ur =
1
M
B
(
F,M, 1 − φr
)
.
Similarly, when the family’s policy is to ﬁre F managers, unskilled managers are retained when
more than F managers are unskilled; that is U − F unskilled managers are retained when U > F .
The expected number of unskilled managers who are retained is
M∑
U=F+1
(
M
U
)
(1 − φr)UφM−Ur (U − F ),
and so a manager’s ex ante probability of being retained while unskilled is
T2(F ) =
1
M
M∑
U=F+1
(
M
U
)
(1 − φr)UφM−Ur (U − F ).
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Firing an additional manager increases the ex ante probability of being retained while unskilled
by9
T2(F + 1) − T2(F ) = − 1
M
M∑
U=F+1
(
M
U
)
(1 − φr)UφM−Ur = −
1
M
[
1 − B(F,M, 1 − φr)].
So if the family moves from a policy of ﬁring F to a policy of ﬁring F + 1, total eﬃciency loss
increases by
[
T1(F + 1) − T1(F )
]
(Axα − k) + [T2(F + 1) − T2(F )] k = 1
M
[
B
(
F,M, 1 − φr
)
Axα − k
]
.
This quantity is increasing in F and has the same sign as B(F,M, 1 − φr) − kAxα . So if there is an
interior solution for F , it is the ﬁrst F for which B(F,M, 1−φr) > kAxα , that is the F that satisﬁes
B
(
F − 1,M, 1 − φr
)
<
k
Axα
< B
(
F,M, 1 − φr
)
. (12)
For each of the M − F retained managers, outside investors will calculate a probability of being
skilled greater than kAxα , since the probability that all retained managers are skilled is B(F,M, 1−
φr) which, from (12), is greater than kAxα . So F managers are ﬁred and M − F work the second
period. If B(0,M, 1 − φr) > kAxα then ﬁring zero is optimal. If B(M − 1,M, 1 − φr) < kAxα , then
the probability that at least one manager is skilled is below kAxα so no manager can work no matter
how many are ﬁred.
Proof of Lemma 4.1
The value of B(0,M, 1−φr) is φMr , which asymptotes to 0 as M grows so, for M large enough,
it is below kAxα . Similarly, the value of B(M − 1,M, 1 − φr) is 1 − (1 − φr)M , which asymptotes
to 1 as M grows so, for M large enough, it is above kAxα .
Proof of Lemma 4.2
Let the random variable U˜ represent the number of unskilled managers when M managers
generate the same ﬁrst-period return r ∈ {−x,+x}. This random variable follows a binomial
distribution Bin
(
M, 1 − φr
)
. Let 1 = 12
k
Axα . From the weak law of large numbers we know that
for any δ ∈ (0, 1) there is an m1 such that M > m1 implies
Pr
{
U˜
M
≤ (1 − φr) − δ
}
< 1 <
k
Axα
. (13)
9Of course, this quantity is negative, reﬂecting the fact that ﬁring an additional manager actually decreases the
likelihood that an unskilled manager is retained.
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From Lemma 4.1, we know that for M large enough (M > m′1, say),
k
Axα
< B
(
F,M, 1 − φr
)
= Pr
{
U˜
M
≤ F
M
}
. (14)
Together, (13) and (14) imply that
F
M
> (1 − φr) − δ (15)
for M > max(m1,m′1).
Similarly, if we let 2 = 12
(
1 − kAxα
)
, we know that for the same δ as above there is an m2 such
that M > m2 implies
Pr
{
U˜
M
≥ (1 − φr) + δ
}
< 2 < 1 − k
Axα
. (16)
From Lemma 4.1, we also have Pr
{
U˜ ≤ F − 1} = B(F − 1,M, 1 − φr) < kAxα for M large enough
(M > m′2, say), which is equivalent to
Pr
{
U˜
M
≥ F
M
}
> 1 − k
Axα
. (17)
Together, (16) and (17) imply that
F
M
< (1 − φr) + δ (18)
for M > max(m2,m′2). So, for M > max(m1,m′1,m2,m′2), (15) and (18) imply that (1− φr)− δ <
F
M < (1 − φr) + δ. Since we can make δ arbitrarily small, this means that FM converges to 1 − φr,
as desired.
Proof of Proposition 4.3
There are two elements to the proof: (i) contracting eﬃciency for M managers who all make
return r ∈ {−x,+x} converges to ﬁrst-best as M goes to inﬁnity; (ii) the eﬀect of the number N of
managers on the distribution of M , combined with (i), implies convergence as N goes to inﬁnity.
(i) Contracting eﬃciency for M managers who make r converges to ﬁrst-best as M goes to
inﬁnity if the expected fraction of unskilled managers who are retained and the expected fraction of
skilled managers who are ﬁred converge to zero as M goes to inﬁnity. As in the proof of Lemma 4.2,
we let the random variable U˜ represent the number of unskilled managers when M managers
generate the same ﬁrst-period return r ∈ {−x,+x}.
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Expected fraction of retained unskilled managers goes to zero. Let us denote the fraction of
retained unskilled managers by f˜U ≡ max(0,U˜−F )M . For any δ ∈ (0, 1), we have
E
[
f˜U
]
= Pr
{
f˜U ≤ δ
}
E
[
f˜U | f˜U ≤ δ
]
+ Pr
{
f˜U > δ
}
E
[
f˜U | f˜U > δ
]
≤ 1 · δ + Pr{f˜U > δ} · 1 = δ + Pr{f˜U > δ}
= δ + Pr
{
U˜ − F
M
> δ
}
= δ + Pr
{
U˜
M
>
F
M
+ δ
}
. (19)
From Lemma 4.2 (and its proof), we know we can choose an m such that M > m implies both that
(1−φr)− δ2 < FM < (1−φr)+ δ2 and also that Pr
{
U˜
M > (1−φr)+ δ2
}
< δ. These inequalities imply
δ > Pr
{
U˜
M
> (1 − φr) + δ2
}
= Pr
{
U˜
M
>
[
(1 − φr) − δ2
]
+ δ
}
≥ Pr
{
U˜
M
>
F
M
+ δ
}
,
so that E
[
f˜U
]
in (19) is smaller than 2δ. Since we can make δ arbitrarily small, this implies that
the expected fraction of retained unskilled managers goes to zero.
Expected fraction of ﬁred skilled managers goes to zero. Let us denote the fraction of ﬁred skilled
managers by f˜S ≡ max(0,F−U˜)M . For any δ ∈ (0, 1), we have
E
[
f˜S
]
= Pr
{
f˜S ≤ δ
}
E
[
f˜S | f˜S ≤ δ
]
+ Pr
{
f˜S > δ
}
E
[
f˜S | f˜S > δ
]
≤ 1 · δ + Pr{f˜S > δ} · 1 = δ + Pr{f˜S > δ}
= δ + Pr
{
F − U˜
M
> δ
}
= δ + Pr
{
U˜
M
<
F
M
− δ
}
. (20)
Again, from Lemma 4.2, we know we can choose an m such that M > m implies both that
(1−φr)− δ2 < FM < (1−φr)+ δ2 and also that Pr
{
U˜
M < (1−φr)− δ2
}
< δ. These inequalities imply
δ > Pr
{
U˜
M
< (1 − φr) − δ2
}
= Pr
{
U˜
M
<
[
(1 − φr) + δ2
]
− δ
}
≥ Pr
{
U˜
M
<
F
M
− δ
}
,
so that E
[
f˜S
]
in (20) is smaller than 2δ. Since we can make δ arbitrarily small, this implies that
the expected fraction of ﬁred skilled managers goes to zero. This completes the ﬁrst part of the
proof.
(ii) To ﬁnish the proof, observe that the number M˜ of managers who generate a ﬁrst-period
return of r follows a binomial distribution with N draws and probability of success p equal to either
1−φα
2 for r = −x or to 1+φα2 for r = +x. Thus from the weak law of large numbers we know that
M˜
N converges in probability to p. From the ﬁrst part of the proof, we know that for any δ ∈ (0, 1)
there is an m such that M˜ > m implies that the expected fraction of the M˜ managers who are
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skilled and ﬁred or unskilled and retained is less than δ2 . The convergence of
M˜
N to p means that
there is an n such that N > n implies that Pr
{
M˜
N ≤ mN
}
< δ2 (since
m
N goes to zero and p stays the
same as N grows). So the expected fraction of managers who are skilled and ﬁred or unskilled and
retained is less than δ2 +
δ
2 = δ. Therefore, since we can make δ arbitrarily small, eﬃciency losses
converge to zero as N goes to inﬁnity. This completes the proof.
25
Appendix B
Proof that w˜2 in (4) is signaling-proof in the second period
At the beginning of the second period, the manager knows whether or not she is skilled. The
investors don’t, and so update the probability that the manager is skilled to, say, φ′ ∈ (0, 1). Any
contract oﬀered to the investors by a skilled manager can and has to be imitated by the unskilled
manager (i.e., the managers pool in equilibrium): otherwise, the manager is immediately identiﬁed
as unskilled, and she is not hired by the second-period investors.
In equilibrium, any contract oﬀered to the second-period investors extracts all of the available
surplus, denoted S for this proof. So, if the contract oﬀered by the manager pays ω+x ≥ 0 for positive
returns, and ω−x ≥ 0 for negative returns, it will be the case that, in this pooling equilibrium,
1 + αφ′
2
ω+x +
1 + αφ′
2
ω−x = S,
which implies that ω+x must satisfy
ω+x = ω−x +
2(S − ω−x)
1 + αφ′
. (21)
The expected compensation of a skilled manager is then
1 + α
2
ω+x +
1 − α
2
ω−x
which, using (21), is equal to
1 + α
1 + αφ′
S − α(1 − φ
′)
1 + αφ′
ω−x.
This last expression is clearly decreasing in ω−x, so the skilled manager will want to reduce it as
much as possible. Given limited liability, it will be the case that the skilled manager prefers a
contract with ω−x = 0 to any other contract allowing investors to break even. Thus the equilibrium
second-period contract is of the form speciﬁed in (4).
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